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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GHE~AT STArrES LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMP ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
TOLEDO METAL ARTS, a Utah 
corporation, aka TOLEDO 
METAL ARr_rs, INC., et al, 
Defendants. 
* * * 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No.11274 
RESP·ONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant's Statement fairly states the case, ex-
('C'pt, that Appellant errs in referring to the Commis-
~ion as the hold<:>r of judgments. The Commission had 
11rJ judgments. The Commission had only and nothing 
11ton• than "vV arran ts" filed. The "Warrants" were 
i11(·ho;: tl'. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff and Respondent Great States Life Insur 
ance Co. was awarded judgment, in its mortgage forr-
closure action, constituting a first, paramount and prior 
lien on the real property being foreclosed. The Com-
mission received judgment, "by reason of tax War-
rants for delinquency'' constituting a priority junior 
to Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts are fairly stated ex-
cept that Appellant errs in ref erring to the Commis-
sion as the holder of a judgment lien; and errs in stat-
ing that a "Warrant" has the force and effect of a 
judgment; and errs in implying that the word "judg-
ment" is contained in Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 59-
14-71 (3) (e), being the Section the Commission relics 
upon. 
The Commission assesses a tax delinquency and if 
the assessment is not satisfied then a "Warrant" is 
later filed with the County Recorder to establish a pri-
ority date for a lien. Utah District Courts haYe con-
sistently recognized the ''Warrant'' filing date as thi: 
date for establishing a lien for priority purposes. Iii 
many cases where District Courts have awarded abso-
lute priority to the "Warrant," except for federal ta.\ 
liens, the amounts of the Warrants were small, there-
fore, the first priority holder paid off the "\Varra11t .. 
to the Commission rather than defend a costly appral. 
2 
rrhe assessment and amount remams ''hidden'' 
from public knowledge until the "Warrant" is filed 
showing the taxable amount due with the taxpayer's 
jl(lffi(', 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIV-
ING PLAINTIFF .JUDGMENT WITH A 
FIRST PRIORITY, WITH THE COMMISSION 
A JUNIOR PRIORITY, IN THIS REAL ES-
TATE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACTION 
BY PLAINTIFF. 
On September 18, 1963, Plaintiff received a Note 
Ohlig:1tion from Toledo Metal Arts, Inc., in the princi-
pal nmount of $43,000.00 and as security a real estate 
~[ortgage. The County Recorder recorded the mortgage 
()JI Sl·ptember 19, 1963. The public recording created a 
iirst, paramount, prior and subsisting lien, on the real 
proprrty, in favor of Plaintiff. Sec. 57-3-2 U.C.A. 
'rhC'reafter the Commission privately assessed the 
1axpnyPr and was r,nable to collect the money and then 
ll'<'C)]'(IL•d "Warrants" on October 19, 1965 in the amount 
r,f ~~2fiG.47 and on January 14, 1966, in the amount of 
;<;~G~).+:1, these being the effective public elates for estab-
li-:l1i11g· an obligntion unto the Commission. 
Tlte "vVarrants" \\'ere unenforceable until the trial 
("1urt pronouncecl judgment. As the Utah Supreme 
\ 1•nrt ;;aid in In Re Capitol Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. 
f'1J11it11l ('lea11ers et al, 120 Utah 285, 233 P.2d 377: 
3 
''A tax obligation which is given the effect of a 
judgment is not a judgment as that term is nSL'<l. 
It cannot be sued on in another state. The eff<iet 
of a judgment is that it is a final determination of 
amount and nature of the obligation imposed alld 
that it is a lien against the judgment debtor's real 
estate in the county where docketed." 
The private ''assessment'' by the Commission is in-
choate. A taxpayer in a court defending against the rr-
corded "Warrant" may defeat the "Warrant" and the 
amount thereof. Therefore, the "Warrant" is "in-
choate'' until reduced to a court judgment. ''As for a 
lien created by state law, its priority depends on the timl' 
1 
it attaches to the property and becomes choate," U. 8. Y. 
Pioneer America!J'l Insurance Co., 374 U.S. 84. Liens are 
perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be 
done to have a choate lien, U. S. v. New Britain, 34i 
u. s. 81. 
The Legislature intended Sec. 59-14-71(3)(e) U.C.A 
to provide an obligation unto and for the Commission. 
effective on the date the "Warrant" is publicly reconkd 
in the County Recorder's Office. The "Warrant'' 
amount is perfected when it becomes a court judgment. 
The legislature did not intend in Sec. 59-14-71(3)(t>L 
U.C.A. to tell the Courts to allow "Warrants" recordrd 
in 1965 and 1966 to be prior and superior to the recon1rd 
mortgage of 1963. Appellant argues otherwise which j, 
unthinkable, unreasonable and unjust, and unconstitn-
tional as to the interests of Respondent. 
4 
~We' firmly believe that for Sec. 39-14-71(3) (e) U.C.A. 
to he coustitutio11al, the amount of the proposed assess-
ment against the taxpayer, by the Commission, should 
he idL'ntified in a "\Varrant" and the "Warrant" pub-
licly recorded with the County Recorder with the docket 
date being the effective lien date for priority purposes. 
Otherwise this Section would be unconstitutional as to 
plaintiff; 
(No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of Law, Utah Const. 
Art 1, Sec. 7; U. S. Constitution 5th and 14th 
Amendments.) 
To allow appellant to prevail in this case would do 
Yiolence to every financial transaction in Utah. Abstracts 
and title searches for loa.n purposes would be untrue and 
uninsurable if a later recorded "\Varrant" were allowed 
a first priority over a prior recorded mortgage. 
The 4th Circuit in 1966 in U. S. v. Clover Spinning 
Mifls Co., S. C. Tax Commission, etc., 373 F. 2d 274 said, 
"A careful reading of the state statutes does not 
indicate an intent to create a "trust" for the 
benefit of the state in other property of an em-
ployer who fails to perform his withholding ob-
ligation.'' 
In the present case, whatever might have been the 
rl·~ult had the Commission been able to point to any fund 
artually withheld by the employer-taxpayer for the taxes 
llf•re in question, no such fund existed in the taxpay-
rT 's hcn1ds and in the absence of any res, llO ''trust'' ' . 
11xistl'd, that was depleted by taxpayer, which could de-
1,,at the firnt security interest of the plaintiff. 
5 
Sec. 59-14-71(3) (e) U.C.A. was not intended to gin 
the Tax Commission a comprehensive secret lien relating 
back for priority :rnd distribution purposes ahead of the 
plaintiff's mortgage. 
At the time plaintiff acquired an equitable and vest-
ed first security interest in the real property hy his re-
corded mortgage of September 19, 1963, there was no 
money due, O\Ying and payable by the taxpayer to the 
Commission and the Tax Commission had not assessed 
any amount due by the Taxpayer. The obligations to 
the Commission, by the Taxpayer, came into pnhlic 
existence by the recording of ""Warrants" on October 
19, 1965, and January 14, 1966. 
r_}_'he effective dates of the obligations ("-Warrants'') 
being in 1965 and 1966 cannot relate back to become effec-
tive prior to the l\fortgage recorded in 1963. If this wrre , 
now declared to be the law of this case it would depri\'C 
plaintiff of his property (Equitable Title) \vi th out due 
process of law. Chaos '.Yith confusion would ensnare tl1e 
financial industry of this State. 
POINT II AND POINT III 
THE rr_A_X OBLIGATIOK l\IUSr_t' BE PEH-
FECTED INTO A LIEN" AND ONCE PEH-
FECTED THE LIEN DATE TAKES ITS 
PLACE IN THE FIRST IN Til\fE IS FIR~T 
IN RIGHT CATEGORY FOR PRIORITY Pl'H-
POSES IN DISTRIBUTION. 
"First in time is first in right" \YR s dee la r1c•t1 in S 1 11 
Britain, supra. Also the "Fedcrn1 Ta.r Lien ~-J,f '' 1 
6 
1 !l(i(j" (PL 87-7] 9) furt here<l this policy and established 
some super priorities. Plaintiff is squarely within the 
"first in time is first in right" policy. Plaintiff could 
and did rely upon the notice of the public records and the 
pro1·isions of Sec. 57-3-2 U. C.A., that it had a first pri-
ority and secured position with its recorded mortgage in 
Hl6J See Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood 
Const. Co., 424 P.2d 437 for public notice, recorded vs. 
unrecorded interests and "first in time is first in right" 
tlieory by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The legislature did not intend Sec. 59-14-71(3) (e) 
U.C.A. to be self-serving and automatic. Something more 
must be done by the Commission to perfect a lien. An 
rxample is the Wisconsin Industrial Commission Statute. 
There, Sec. 108.22(2) Stats., provides that the amount 
due the Commission is to be determined by an adminis-
trative proceeding pursuant to Sec. 108, 10 Stats. Once 
this ~•mount is determined, Sec. 108.22(2) specifies that: 
''The clerk shall enter in the judgment docket the 
name of the employer mentioned in the Warrant 
and the amount of the contributions, interest, 
costs and other fees for which the warrant is is-
sued and the date when such copy is filed. There-
upon the warrant so docketed shall be considered 
in all respects as a final judgment creating a per-
fect lien upon the employer's right, title and inter-
est in all of his real and personal property located 
in the county wherein the warrant is docketed.'' 
In North Gate Corp. & Wisconsin Ind. Com. v. North 
i;afe Bowl, 149 N.\-V.2d 651, 67-1 U.S.T.C. Sec. 9384 
i 1 %7), the Commission's tax u;arrant for an amount was 
docketed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County on June 17, 1965. 
''Thus, the Industrial Commission l>ccomrs a 
judgment ereditor only because the statute make.~ 
the commission's lien a judgment lien. The lien 
is not obtained by going through a court proced-
ure nor is it obtained by obtaining a judgment in 
a state court.'' 
Appellant's reliance on 31 U.S.C., Sec. 191 is ill 
founded. Sec. 191 does not create a lien. It merely es-
tablishes a priority in favor of the U. S. when the in-
solvent debtor's property is distributed, U. S. v. 111enier 
Ha rd ware, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448, \Vi th the Bank-
ruptcy Statute, 11 U.S.C., See. 104, establishing the 
state's priority as 4th for distribution purposes and the 
United States priority as 5th. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's priority and judgment should he• up-
held. Section 59-14-71(3)(e) U.C.A. should be dl'clarril 
unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to deprive Rr-
spondent of its priority. Otherwise, the Section could 
allow a secret obligation (assessment) subsequently dt•-
termined to be due and owing by a taxpayer to the ('om-
missic1n to become a recorded public notice (Tran11iill 
perfected for lien security purposes ahead of established 
liens. All liens s11oulcl be ranked with the recorcliug (Ld 1• 
being the effective elate, chronologicall~-, for prinritY 
and distribution purposes. The Section should not h· 
allowed to destroy public confidence in financially :-;N·nr' · 
8 
rt>C'O rded transactions. The "first in time is first in right" 
theory should prevail here on plaintiff's behalf. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
and 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
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